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Limited commitment to contracts can explain imperfect risk sharing even when
individuals have access to complete insurance markets. Past contributions have fo-
cused on the resulting cross-sectional distribution of consumption (Cordoba 2008,
Krueger and Perri 2006). In contrast, this paper looks at the joint dynamics of
income, consumption and wealth implied by the asymmetric nature of partial in-
surance under limited commitment, where negative income shocks are largely in-
sured but positive shocks can lead to large rises in consumption. A theoretical
section proves the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a limited commit-
ment continuum economy where incomes follow a standard markov process, and
solves analytically for the joint equilibrium distribution of consumption, income
and wealth. I show that individual consumption follows, at least locally, a left-
skewed geometric distribution. Also, the conditional distributions of consumption
and wealth are highly non-linear and have a characteristic form of heteroscedastic-
ity, with declining conditional variances as income increases. In a quantitative part,
the paper compares the exact distributions in the Krueger and Perri (2006) model
to non-parametric estimates of their counterparts in US micro-data, and in a simple
Ayagari economy.
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draft. All remaining errors are of course mine.
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1 Introduction
The economist's toolbox has two classical ways of modelling the relation between individ-
ual incomes and consumption: on the one hand, the assumption of complete insurance
markets is especially convenient for macro-economists, as it provides a rationale for their
customary focus on a \representative" consumer. On the other, the permanent income
hypothesis, that individuals smooth consumption of their expected lifetime resources by
simple saving and borrowing, is appealing as it puts minimal requirements on the assets
and information available to individuals. However, empirically, there is evidence against
both perfect risk-sharing (see e.g. Attanasio and Davis 1996) and simple self-insurance
(see e.g. Hall and Mishkin 1982). Moreover, conceptually, the permanent income hypoth-
esis lacks a micro-foundation for the absence of assets other than non-contingent bonds,
while the complete markets model requires enforcement of very large and persistent net
transfers between individuals, as well as detailed public information on individual con-
tingencies. More recent alternatives to the classical benchmarks, on the other hand, do
not restrict asset markets a priori, but take seriously the information and enforcement
problems of the complete markets model. Particularly, a growing literature has looked
at economies with \limited commitment", where individuals have the option to \default"
on contracts. As long as default is unattractive, for example because it leads to exclusion
from nancial trade in the future, this setup allows for some, but not perfect, risk-sharing
even against very persistent shocks to income.
Two recent papers analyse the implications of limited commitment for the cross-sectional
distribution of agents in an economy with many agents. Krueger and Perri (2006) show
that the model can help reconcile the substantial rise in US income inequality over the
last 20 years with the more stable inequality of consumption. Cordoba (2008) concludes,
however, that the model captures the concentration of wealth at the top of the distribution
less well than a simple Ayagari economy. This paper takes a dierent strategy. Rather
than concentrating on particular moments of marginal distributions, it analyses, both
theoretically and in a calibrated version of the model, the non-parametric characteristics
of the joint distribution of consumption, wealth and income under limited commitment.
2Particularly, I show how the asymmetry of insurance under limited commitment, where
negative income risks are pooled but positive shocks lead to idiosyncratic rises in con-
sumption if participation constraints bind, implies a characteristic form of non-linearity
and heteroscedasticity of the joint distributions. The main theoretical contribution of the
paper is to prove existence and uniquencess of a stationary equilibrium in a continuum
economy with limited commitment to contracts, and to provide an analytical character-
isation of the distribution of consumption and income, including a closed form solution
for an example with two income states and CRRA preferences. The theory shows how
the asymmetric nature of insurance implies declining conditional variances of wealth and
consumption along the income distribution, and a negative relationship between wealth
and income on average. The quantitative part of the paper looks at an economy with
capital and a more general income process, to confront the joint equilibrium distribution,
and its characteristic form of non-linearity and heteroscedasiticity, with the data. For
this, I calculate the exact joint distributions in the Krueger and Perri (2006) calibration
of the model, and compare them to non-parametric estimates of their counterparts from
US micro-data, and to those from a simple Ayagari economy. The results show that,
even with a more realistic income process featuring both near-permanent and transitory
shocks, the limited commitment economy still produces very asymmetric joint distri-
butions: consumption growth has a oor slightly below zero, but an upward tail that
becomes more important for stronger positive income shocks. And both the mean and
variance of wealth fall with income. Both the data and the Ayagari model produce less
heteroscedastic distributions, and mean wealth that rises with income.
This work contributes to a large literature that analyses insurance contracts with lim-
ited commitment. In early work, Thomas and Worrall (1988) looked at self-enforcing
long-term contracts between a rm and a risk-neutral worker, when both can costlessly
renege on past commitments to take advantage of random uctuations in the price of
labour. In equilibrium, wages can uctuate, but only to remain within a time-varying in-
terval of values that satises participation constraints of both parties. Kehoe et al (1993)
prove the rst welfare theorem in an endowment economy with complete markets where
participation-constraints on consumption sets prevent default. Competitive equilibria are
thus constrained ecient, but may feature less than perfect risk sharing unless discount
factors are high enough. Kocherlakota (1996) shows that, with a nite number of agents,
relative marginal utilities are a sucient description of the state of the economy, and
equilibrium contracts have "amnesia": constrained agents' consumption is independent
3of past income realisations. Ligan, Thomas and Worrall (1998) show how this implies
asymmetry in the consumption paths of participation-constrained and unconstrained in-
dividuals: all unconstrained agents share (in a marginal utility sense) the same drop in
consumption, while constrained agents experience relative consumption increases depend-
ing on their individual income realisations. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) prove the second
welfare theorem and consider asset pricing.
In a similar manner to the present paper, Krueger and Perri (2005) are interested in par-
ticipation constrained risk sharing in large western economies, and thus look at a setting
with a continuum of agents who receive nite income realisations according to an iden-
tical Markov process. They use a dual method  a la Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995) to
show that, for any given interest rate, there exists a unique stationary consumption dis-
tribution, and that aggregate excess demand for consumption increases in interest rates.
And, based on a conjecture about the existence of a market clearing interest rate, they
characterise the consumption distribution for the special case with 2 iid income values.
Relative to this literature, the theoretical contribution of the present paper is three-fold:
First, I am able to show the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium in a limited
commitment continuum economy with standard markov uncertainty, under standard as-
sumptions. Second, I provide a closed form for the stationary distribution of consumption,
income and wealth with 2 income values and CRRA preferences. The marginal distri-
bution of consumption is a left-skewed geometric, and the conditional variances of both
consumption and wealth decline with income. Third, I characterise analytically the joint
distribution for an N-state markov income process. The geometric nature of consumption
continues to hold, but only locally. And with i.i.d. uncertainty, both consumption and
wealth still see their conditional variances decline with income.
The empirical literature has tested the implications of limited commitment models
using, for example, data on consumption and income in rural villages (Townsend 1994,
Ligan et al 1998, Eozenou 2008), or from experimental settings (Barr 2008, Albarran
2003). More directly relevant to this paper is the work of Krueger and Perri (2006), who
analyse the performance of the limited commitment model, relative to more standard
incomplete markets models, in explaining why consumption volatility has increased much
less than income risk in the United States over the last 30 years. They nd that incom-
plete market models have too limited risk sharing, while the limited commitment model
slightly underpredicts the change in consumption volatility implied by the observed rise
in income risk. However, they focus mainly on the relative change in inequality mea-
4sures. Cordoba (2008) uses numerical simulations to argue that models with - in his case
- exogenous, debt-constraints can potentially reproduce key features of the cross-sectional
distribution of consumption, but capture the wealth distribution much less well than sim-
ple incomplete markets models.
In its quantitative section, this paper looks at the shape of joint, rather than marginal,
distributions. This is because the non-linear, heteroscedastic shape of the distributions
results directly from the asymmetric nature of insurance under limited commitment. It is
thus more robust to changes in the calibration or specication of the model than, for ex-
ample, the shape of right hand tails of marginal distributions. Particularly, I compare the
joint densities of consumption, wealth and income in the Krueger and Perri (2006) limited
commitment economy to, on the one hand, non-parametric estimates of its counterparts
in US micro-data, and, on the other, the distributions in a simple self-insurance economy.
The results show that the data does not reproduce the oor in consumption growth or
the declining conditional variances of consumption and wealth at higher income values
that the limited commitment model predicts. Rather, the shape of the distributions in
the data, where mean consumption inceases more or less linearly with income, and wealth
increases, rather than falls, as income rises, seem more in line with the distributions from
the simple Ayagari self-insurance economy.
Section II describes the environment of a continuum economy with debt-constrained
domestic nancial markets. Section III derives some characteristics of dynamic equilibria
on the basis of the associated planner's problem. Section IV gives the analytical char-
acterisation of the stationary joint distribution of consumption, income and wealth, and
proves the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Section IV reports the results from a
calibration of the model to the US economy and compares them to those from a simple
self-insurance economy, and US micro-data. An appendix contains most proofs.
2 A continuum economy with debt-constrained com-
plete nancial markets
This section presents a simple economy with complete asset markets where insurance
against idiosyncratic income shocks is constrained by individual default, and denes the
competitive equilibrium.
52.1 The economic environment
The economy consists of a large number of individuals of unit mass. Individuals are
indexed by i, located on a unit-interval i 2 I = [0;1] with Sigma-Algebra I. Denote
as I : I ! [0;1] the (constant) non-atomic measure of individuals. Time is discrete
t 2 f0;1;2;:::;1g and a unique perishable endowment good is used for consumption.
The consumption endowment of agent i in period t, zi;t, takes values in a nite set Z:
zi;t 2 Z = fz1 > z2 > ::: > zNg;N  2. Let Z be the power set of Z, and denote as
Z;t : Z ! [0;1] the measure of agents at all (subsets of) income realisations in period
t. Endowments follow a Markov process that is independent of i, and I-measurable
(i.e. fi : zi;t+1 = zkjzi;t = zjg 2 I; 8zj;zk). Specically, it is described by a Markov
transition matrix F that has strictly positive entries fi;j > 0;8i;j, is monotone (in the
sense that the conditional expectation of an increasing function of tomorrow's income is
itself an increasing function of today's income), and has a unique ergodic distribution
Z : Z ! [0;1]. Thus, in the long-run, aggregate (or average) income Y =
R
zidI is
constant, while individual income uctuates. Let Z0 : I ! Z be a measurable function
that assigns all individuals an initial income value. Also, let st denote the state of the
economy in period t, a vector containing individual incomes and asset holdings of all
agents.






where Es0 is the mathematical expectation conditional on s0, 0 <  < 1 discounts future
utility, ci;t is consumption by agent i in period t, and u : R+ ! R is an increasing, strictly
concave, twice-continuously dierentiable function that saties Inada conditions and is
identical for all agents in the economy.
2.2 Asset markets with debt constraints
Agents engage in sequential trade of a complete set of state-contingent bonds. Individual
endowment realisations are veriable and contractable, but asset contracts are not com-
pletelely enforceable: at any point, individuals can default on their contractual payments
at the price of eternal exclusion from nancial markets. Thus the total amount an agent
can borrow today against any income state tomorrow is bounded by the option to default
6into nancial autarky. There, consumption is forever equal to income. Given the markov
structure of income, the value of default as a function of the vector of current income z





tU(z) = (I   F)
 1U(z) (2)
Note that the monotonicity of F implies monotonicity of W(z) (Dardanoni 1995).
I denote holdings of Arrow-Debreu securities paying o in state st by a(st). In any state
st, V (z(st);a(st)) is the contract value as a function of income z(st) and current asset
holdings a(st). As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), individual i's participation constraint
for any state st+1 tomorrow can be written as a portfolio constraint on the claims she can
issue against st+1 income.1 This borrowing constraint is \not too tight" in the words of
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) if it assures participation but does not constrain contracts
otherwise
ai(st+1)  Ai(st+1) = minf(st+1) : V (zi(st+1);(st+1))  W(zi(st+1))g (3)
To focus on the interesting case of limited insurance, I make the following assumptions












Assumption 1 assures that full insurance is not possible, since the autarky value at high
income exceeds that of consuming average income in the economy forever. Assumption
2 implies that there is no positive net interest rate that would implement the autarky
equilibrium, as the marginal rate of substitution between the highest and lowest income
state is too low. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that this is sucient to rule out
autarky as an equilibrium.
1An alternative is to restrict choices directly, by requiring that the chosen consumption sequence fulll
participation constraints, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993).
72.3 The household's problem
Every period, households maximise their expected utility by choosing current consumption
and assets subject to budget and participation constraints


















where c;a0 are policy functions of the state variables (z(s);a(s)).
2.4 Denition of competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of asset prices q(s0), a set of individual
decision rules c(z;a);a0(z;a) with associated value functions V (z;a)
such that
1. V (z;a) are the households maximum value functions associated with the household
problem given q(s0)
2. V (z;a) is attained by c(z;a);a0(z;a)
3. Markets for state-contingent assets clear
R
ai(s0)dI = 0;8s0
The competitive equilibrium is called \stationary" if the distribution of individual
consumption is stationary through time.
3 Ecient allocations
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that a version of the rst welfare theorem applies to this
economy as long as interest rates are \high", in the sense that today's market value of total
8future resources is nite.2 This allows me to focus on participation-constrained ecient
allocations, where the assumption of some risk sharing assures that the interest rate
condition is met. More particularly, I exploit the results in Marcet and Marimon (2009),
and focus on the solution to the participation-constrained social planner's problem.
3.1 The planner's problem
Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how the ecient allocation solves the following planner's
problem. For a given measurable assignment of welfare weights to individuals 0 : I ! R+





0 tu(ci;t)dI the problem of the planner is
to distribute resources optimally subject to individuals' participation constraints and the













Vi(st)  W(zi(st)); 8st;i
where the planner's maximum value VV is a function of the initial measure of weights and
income induced by 0;Z0. I assume that the initial weighting function 0 is measurable
and takes a nite number of nite, positive values 1;:::;k with I(i : i;0 = k) >
0; for k = 1;:::;K and I(fi : i * f1;:::;Kgg) = 0.
Note that this problem is non-standard, because the participation-constraints in (7) in-
troduce history dependence. Intuitively, the planner provides value to individuals who
have attractive outside options by promising them high consumption today and in the
future. But this requires him to honour promises made in the past, making the problem
non-recursive. As a solution, this section applies a technique proposed by Marcet and
Marimon (2009) that makes the problem recursive. Their results, however, do not apply
to continuum economies in general, as they focus on an environment with a nite number
of agents. But with a nite number of income values and a discrete initial distribution
of planner weights, we can always replace integration over an innity of indivuals i by
2An additional technical condition requires that for all i, there is a constant i such that for all zt,
ju(ci;t(st))j < i(u0(ci;t(st)))ci;t(zt)). Note that this is a joint condition on utility and the equilibrium
allocation. It is met in most relevant cases, for example if relative risk aversion is dierent from 1 at zero,
or if consumption is uniformly bounded away from zero, which is the case in the setting of this paper.
9summation over a countable number of sets of individuals that share all relevant charac-
teristics. In particular, in any period t, we can split the uncountable set I into KNt sets
of individuals I0;fzg that share initial weight k and income history fz0;z1;:::;ztg. This
ensures the countability of the planner's state space. A later section shows that this space
remains, in fact, strictly nite.
Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how to capture the history dependence of the problem
by an individual-specic summary variable. Particularly, they show that, denoting i the
Lagrange multiplier on i's participation constraint in the sequential problem (7), we can













;z(j;zl)[cjl   zl]  0 (9)

0





= f : I(i : i;t = ) > 0g(12)
where I write xjl for the function x(j;zl). Note that the weights of individuals in the
social welfare function are now updated every period to meet participation constraints,
according to the law of motion (10). Intuitively, by increasing individual weights i the
planner allocates a higher than expected consumption path to individuals with binding
participation constraints, to keep them \happy" with the contract. Policies cjl;jl are a
function of planner weights at the beginning of the period and current income realisations
only, so do not depend on past state variables. In other words, the time-varying individual
weights now summarise history-dependence of the problem. Importantly, the cardinality
of the set of individual planner weights with positive mass
Wt increases by a factor of
at most N every period, and therefore remains countable. Equivalently, the integration
across individuals along measure I is replaced by the weighted summation over (the
Euclidean product of) the set of current income realisations Z and the time-varying set
of planner weights with positive mass
Wt, where the weights have discrete measure ;z.
With discrete
Wt and Z, the state space is nite and bounded, and thus compact, for
all t. And Tychono's theorem ensures that it remains compact even for a countably
innite number of periods. With concave utility and nite resources, and in the absence
of aggregate state variables entering the participation constraints, the constraint set is
10therefore compact and convex. It is also non-empty since autarky is trivially feasible and
incentive-compatible. Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how this is sucient to ensure the
equivalence of the sequential problem (7) and the transformed problem (8).3 In particular,
the planner's value function is single valued and, given continuously dierentiable utility,
dierentiable. And nally, Inada conditions and concavity of the utility function imply
that, to characterise the optimum, participation constraints and the rst order conditions
suce.
3.2 Properties of ecient allocations
Although this paper is mainly concerned with the stationary joint distribution of consump-
tion, income and wealth, the rest of this section shows two features of any equilibrium
with limited commitment: rst, there is asymmetry in insurance, as the planner insures
consumers against drops in income, while accomodating rises in income with potentially
strong consumption increases. Thomas et al (1998) show this in an environment with a
nite number of agents, while I analyse the implications for the stationary joint distri-
butions in a continuum economy. Relatedly, contracts feature \amnesia" (Kocherlakota
1996), as history dependence of individual consumption is cut o once participation con-
straints bind. Throughout, I denote as \continuation value" V (t;zt) the utility that
an individual with current weight t and income zt can expect under the planners con-
sumption allocation, as opposed to the autarky value W(zt) she gets from consuming her
income stream from today onwards.
It is easy to see that the solution of the planner's problem denes an operator   that
maps today's distribution of individual weights and current income into a distribution of
weights and income tomorrow.4 The next Lemma summarises some old and new results
that characterise  .
Lemma 1 The planner's decision rule   has the form
i;t+1 = maxft+1(zi;t+1);i;tg
3In other words, the problem fullls conditions A1 to A5 in Marcet and Marimon (2009). For further
detail, see also the proof of uniqueness and existence in the Appendix.
4Or formally   : (Z  RKN
t
+ ;Z  BKN
t
) ! [0;1], where Bn is the Borel algebra of the n-dimensional
positive Euclidean space, and the cardinality of the set of welfare weights, equal to K in period 0, increases
by N every period.
11For every t, t(z) is strictly increasing in z; and for every z, the sequence t(z) increases
strictly over time. Also, the set of individual planner weights with positive mass is strictly
nite: jfj : I(fi : i;t = jg) > 0gj < 1;8t.
That individual weights increase when participation constraints bind but are constant
otherwise is well-known from Marcet and Marimon (2009), and follows directly from the
equivalence of  and the Lagrange multipliers of the untransformed planner's problem.
Also, since the outside option of autarky only depends on current income, planner weights
of individuals with binding participation constraints t(zi;t) are, for any t, equally a func-
tion only of their current income zi;t. This lack of history dependence in consumption of
constrained individuals is well-known as the "amnesia" property of consumption alloca-
tions with limited commitment (since Kocherlakota 1996).5
On the other hand, that t(zi;t), the minimum planner weight that ensures participation
of individuals with income zi;t, is strictly increasing in both income and time has not been
shown before. But this result is very useful for showing existence and uniqueness of a
stationary solution to (8), and to compute it eciently using rst order conditions. It is
proved in the appendix, along with its implication that
Wt, the set of planner weights i;t,
is not only countable but strictly nite.
Lemma 1 has immediate consequences for the dynamics of the joint distribution of
consumption and income. To see this, note that, for  the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the ressource constraint (9), the planner's intratemporal optimality condition
equates weighted marginal utilities across agents,  = (i+i)U0(ci)8i. From this, relative







So the current distribution of planner weights maps monotonously into current con-
sumption. There are thus N minimum participation-compatible consumption values
ci
0;t;i = 1;:::;N that correspond to the minimum planner weights t(z) and are increasing
5To see this formally, consider two agents i;j with dierent weights i;t 6= j;t who receive a same
income shock zi;t+1 = zi;t+1 that implies autarky values higher than their continuation utility at cur-
rent weights. With equal income today, they face the same conditional measures over future income
realisations. So if i;t+1 is the minimum weight that meets i's participation constraint, it is also the min-
imum weight that meets j's participation constraint. And since continuation values V (t;zt) are strictly
increasing in t, the cuto t(zi;t) is unique.
12in income. From this, it is easy to see that the highest income earners have highest con-
sumption, while those with lowest consumption have necessarily the lowest income level.
This lowest consumption level, since it solves the participation constraint at minimum
income with equality, is easily seen to be constant through time, and equal to zN. So
there is a constant lower bound of consumption equal to minimum income.
Intratemporal optimality on the other hand requires growth rates of marginal utility to
equal relative growth rates of planner weights, discounted and adjusted for changes in the














This immediately implies that all unconstrained agents, who have constant planner weights,
share the same growth rate of marginal utility, equal to the change in the discounted
marginal value of resources to the planner 0
 = R. The result is a convenient law of







Equations (15) and (14) show two important characteristics of consumption transitions
in limited commitment economies: discreteness and asymmetry. This is because, unless
R = 1 and insurance is perfect, all unconstrained agents share common, discrete falls in
marginal utility over time, independent of their current level of income. Agents with bind-
ing participation constraints after a positive income shock, on the other hand, experience
jumps in consumption to a level that is specic to their current income.
4 Existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium
and its distributional characteristics
This section provides an analytical characterisation of the joint distribution of consump-
tion and income. As in Krueger and Perri (2005), I concentrate on stationary consumption
distributions.6 The fact that stationarity of the consumption distribution implies a con-
stant interest rate in the economy and vice versa conveniently means that we can index
6Note that limited commitment economies also admit non-stationary pareto-inecient equilibria,
where a path of decreasing interest rates conrms expectations of ever tighter borrowing limits, lead-
ing to convergence to autarky. See Bloise et al (2009).
13dierent stationary distributions by the value of R.7 But contrary to Krueger and Perri
(2005), I prove the existence of a unique market clearing interest rate. To do this it turns
out to be convenient to rst characterise the stationary consumption allocation for a given
R, and then to exploit its characteristics to show market-clearing at a particular unique
value R?.
4.1 The stationary distribution of consumption and income
Proposition 1 For 1 < R < 1
 the interest rate in stationary equilibrium, the joint
distribution of income and consumption C : C  Z  ! [0;1] has the following features:
1. C is discrete, with positive mass at consumption values between minimum income
and some upper bound c1




2. There are N minimum levels of consumption ci
0; i = 1;:::;N under which con-
sumption of agents with income i never falls and where participation constraints at
income zi hold with equality. These threshold levels are constant through time and
increasing in income c1
0 < c2
0 < :::: < cN
0 . The lower bound of the distribution is
minimum income cN
0 = zN.
3. Every consumption threshold ci
0 is an upper bound to a geometric subdistribution
of consumption i
C, with support fci
jg recursively dened by the law of motion
U0(ci
j+1) = (R) 1U0(ci
j);j = 0;1;2;:::, and bounded below by zN. C is thus a
mixture of N   1 geometric distributions. The appendix contains an analytical ex-
pression for the frequencies in this distribution.
4. Individuals at the highest income level z1 all have maximum consumption level c1
0.
The support of consumption conditional on income zi < z1;i > 1 is [ci
0;c1
1]. So
the support of consumption narrows as income rises. For i.i.d. transitions (iden-
tical rows in F), this implies that the conditional variance of consumption falls
monotonously in income.
7To see this, look at any minimum participation compatible consumption value ci
0 and that corre-
sponding to the rst unconstrained transition away from it ci







that this is a constant. The converse is proved by the construction of the stationary distribution in the
appendix.
14The proof of proposition 1 is by construction of the stationary distribution, and can be
found in the appendix. The joint distribution of nancial returns and income follows as
a corollary.
Corollary 1 The joint distribution of net nancial returns and income yfin;z : B([c1
0  
z1;c1
1   zN])  Z  ! [0;1] has the following features:




 Individuals at minimum income have positive nancial returns yN
fin;0  0. All indi-
viduals at the highest income level z1, and participation-constrained individuals at
income zi > zN have negative nancial returns yi
fin;0  0, with strict inequality for
i = 1.
 To the geometric consumption distribution with upper bound ci
0 corresponds a dis-
tribution that consists of a mass point at yi
fin;0  0, plus a support ci
j   yk;k =
1;:::i   1;j = 1;2;:::. The frequency distribution follows from that of the joint
distribution of consumption and income, which can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 and its corollary show how the asymmetric nature of partial insurance under
limited commitment aects the joint cross-sectional distribution: High income individuals
have a narrow distribution of consumption, as their minimum participation-compatible
consumption level is binding. They also have low nancial returns, as they are making
net contributions into the insurance scheme. Low income earners, on the other hand,
receive net payments from insurance claims, but have a variety of consumption values
that decline with the length of their low income spell.
4.2 A closed form example
A simplied version of the economy, with CRRA preferences u = c1 
1  , two income values
fzh;zlg and transition matrix F = [p;1   p;1   q;q], yields a closed form solution.
Proposition 2 With N = 2 and CRRA preferences, and for 1 < R < 1
 the interest
rate in stationary equilibrium, denote the joint distribution of income and consumption
15C : C  fzl;zhg  ! [0;1]. The discrete support of consumption C is
c1 = f(p;q;m;Wh;Wl) (16)
ci = c1(R)
i
;1 < i < m
cm = z
l (17)




The frequency mass function is geometric, given by
C(c1;zh) =
1   q
2   q   p
: =  (19)






C(;) = 0 otherwise (22)
Here, Wh;Wl are the autarky values at zh;zl given by
Wh =
(1   q)u(y0 + 1
) + (1   p)u(y0   1
1 )
1   (q + p)   2(1   (q + p))
(23)
Wl =
(1   q)u(y0 + 1
) + (1   p)u(y0   1
1 )
1   (q + p)   2(1   (q + p))
(24)















1 . Note that the frequency mass function C is the same with general, non-
CRRA, preferences.
Proof
To obtain the discrete support of consumption C, dene cm as the minimum participation-
compatible consumption for an individual in the low income state zl. As she cannot move
further down in consumption, she is necessarily participation-constrained in both income
states tomorrow, receiving values Wh and Wl respectively. Thus cm is determined from
her participation constraint as
Wl = U(cm) + [(1   q)Wh + qWl]
16which is solved by cm = zl from the denition of Wl. So minimum consumption is equal
to minimum income.
The strict monotonicity of the sequence t(zh) and the niteness of initial weights together
imply that for any i;0, we have t(zh) > i;0 for some nite t. So in the stationary allo-
cation, an individual in the high income state is always constrained, receiving minimum
participation-compatible consumption c1, whose value we need to determine. Tomorrow
she either remains at high income, receiving Wh, or gets a negative income shock and




c1. Thus, the expected value of her consumption stream under the contract
can be expressed as the sum of m lotteries with two outcomes: either, in case of a positive





1  ;i = 1 plus participation in the next lottery for i = 2,
and so forth. If she has not received a positive shock after m-1 periods, her consumption
cannot fall by another whole step without violating her participation-constraint at low
income. So there is a nal lottery between receiving Wh and Wl. This means c1 is uniquely
















i 1(1   q)Whg + (1   p)
mq
m 1Wl (25)
To derive the mass function C, note that the stationary mass at c1 is that at income
state zh, equal to the rst entry of the normalised left eigenvector of transition matrix
F associated with a unit eigenvalue  =
1 q
2 q p. C(c2;zl) is simply  times transition
probability to low income (1   p), and C(ci;zl) = (1   p)qi 1; i = 2:::m   1 declines
geometrically with survival probability q, the probability of remaining in low income state
zl. Finally, the lower bound cm has mass C(cm) = C(cm 1)
q
1 q. 
The next corollary summarises the shape of the distribution and derives some of its
second moments. The proof is in the appendix.
Corollary 2 With CRRA preferences and 2 income values, the following is true:
1. The covariance between income and consumption is positive. The covariances be-
tween income and both nancial returns and wealth are negative.
2. The mean of consumption increases in income. Its conditional variance decreases.
173. If C(cm;zl)  0, the cross-sectional variance of log-consumption in stationary equi-
librium is





where  > 0 is a function of transition probabilities only. If there is a non-negligible
mass at the truncation point, C(cm;zl) > 0, this is an upper bound for the cross-
sectional variance of individual consumption.
With 2 income values, the asymmetric nature of insurance under limited commitment
thus implies a geometric cross-sectional distribution of consumption. Negative income
shocks lead to a sequence of equal small steps down the distribution, while positive income
shocks lead to a variety of consumption responses. And insurance becomes more ecient
at higher interest rates, as illustrated by the negative relationship between the cross-
sectional variance of consumption and R in corollary 2.
This section extends previous characterisations of limited commitment economies with
two income values in several ways. Krueger and Perri (2005), and similarly Krueger and
Uhlig (2006), show for the i.i.d. case that the stationary ecient allocation under limited
commitment is discrete with geometrically declining mass, for a given constant interest
rate. For the CRRA case, I solve for the whole distribution including the support of
consumption, wealth and nancial income (see appendix) in closed form, analysing the
more general case with persistent income. Moreover, the corollaries to proposition 2
characterise conditional and second moments of the distribution, including a closed form
for the variance of log consumption in the case of negligible truncation, showing how lower
interest rates are associated with higher consumption variance in stationary equilibrium.
4.3 Existence and uniqueness of a market-clearing interest rate
The previous sections characterised the equilibrium distribution of consumption and in-
come for a given level of interest rates R. This section proves the existence of a unique
stationary market-clearing interest rate R? > 1.






8c1 < c2 (27)
then there exists a unique stationary market-clearing interest rate R? > 1.






[ of interest rates to the space of stationary consumption distributions. By
summing over the distribution and subtracting constant aggregate income Y , this yields




dI   Y . Note that this map-
ping is single-valued, as the algorithm has a unique solution for any R 2 IR, and that
J
(R) coincides for R > 1 with the stationary solution to the planners problem given





u0(zN). The proof shows that
J
(R) is decreasing for Raut < R < 1 and
increasing for 1 < R < 1
. This implies that for some R? > 1 excess demand is negative.
Existence then follows from the fact that excess demand must be positive for R = 1
 as
perfect insurance is unfeasible by assumption. Uniqueness follows from the monotonicity
of
J
(R) for R > 1.
From Proposition 1, the consumption distribution C splits naturally into N subdistri-
butions m
C bounded above by cm
0 , the minimum participation-compatible consumption
at income zm;m = 1;:::;N. For any m, consider m
C as a function of the interest rate R.














ijjmu(zij)] = 0 (28)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the participation constraint is binding.
Here, i is the index for unconstrained transitions of consumption starting from the con-
strained level cm
0 , i = 0;1;:::;n. zij;j = N;N   1;::: are the possible income states for
an individual who has remained unconstrained for i periods, with associated conditional
probabilities ijjm, while ijm =
P
j ijjm is the marginal probability that an individual
at income zm remains unconstrained for i periods, and 0 = 1. Note that in (28), only
unconstrained states appear, as continuation and autarky values cancel in the participa-
tion constraint for all constrained future states. Dierentiating (28) totally with respect















where the second equality follows from the law of motion (15). Since R i is a positive
sequence, dci has to take both negative and positive values.





















The constant term 2 is strictly positive, while 0 < 1  1 for any utility function










dR > 0. In other words, the sequence dci crosses the zero line
exactly once from below. The change of aggregate consumption by individuals on the










 idci = 0 for R < 1 (R > 1) (31)
where the inequality (inverse inequality) follows from the fact that R i overweighs (un-
derweighs) the latter, positive elements of the sequence dci when interest rates are below
(above) 1. As this holds for all m,
J
is decreasing in interest rates at levels R < 1, reach-
ing a minimum at R = 1, and rises with R from thereon. Since for R = 1= insurance is
perfect, which is unfeasible by assumption 1, excess demand crosses the zero line exactly
once at some 1 < R < 1
. 
5 The distribution of consumption and wealth com-
pared to the data
This section looks at the stationary joint distribution of consumption, income and wealth,
characterised theoretically in the previous section, for a calibrated version of the US econ-
omy. I compare these to the distributions in a standard self-insurance economy on the
one hand, and in US micro-data on the other.
Previous studies on consumption insurance in calibrated economies usually have not
looked at the shape of the implied joint distributions, but focused on particular moments
of marginal distributions. This is true also for studies of limited commitment economies,
such as Krueger and Perri (2006) who analyse changes in cross-sectional variances of in-
come and consumption over time, or Cordoba (2008), who concentrates on variances and
the upper tails of marginal distributions. Studies of the empirical distribution of con-
sumption and income, on the other hand, have pointed out asymmetries. Battistin et al
20(2007), for example, conclude that the marginal distribution of consumption is close to a
log-normal, i.e. has signicant right-hand skew. Dynan et al (2006) show that in PSID
data, while consumption responds more strongly to negative income shocks, this asym-
metry has fallen over time, which they take as evidence of declining liquidity constraints.
Krueger and Perri (2008), on the other hand, show that in the Italian Household Survey
the relation between nondurable consumption and income changes unexplained by a rst
stage regression on household characteristics is largely linear, with a slightly stronger re-
sponse of consumption to positive income changes. This section looks at asymmetries in
joint distributions both in theory and US micro-data.
5.1 A quantitative model calibrated to the US economy
This section briey describes the Krueger and Perri (2006) calibration of a limited com-
mitment economy with production. For the income process, the authors assume the log
of post tax labour income plus transfers (LEA+) log(zt) to be the sum of a group specic
component t and an idiosyncratic part yt. The latter, in turn, is the sum of a persistent
AR(1) process mt, with persistence parameter  and variance 2
m, plus a completely tran-
sitory component "t which has mean zero and variance 2
".
The process for LEA+ is thus of the form
log(zt) = t + yt
yt = mt + "t







Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), the authors rst partial out
the group-specic component t as a function of education and other variables, identifying
the variance of the idiosyncratic part of income yt, as well as (from the short panel
dimension of the CEX) its rst order autocorrelation. Setting  = 0:09989, the value
estimated by Storesletten et al (2004), then allows the identication of 2
 and 2
". In
this study, I use 2
 = 0:26 and 2
" = 0:12, the estimate for the year 2003, the endpoint
of the Krueger and Perri (2006) sample. I then use the standard Tauchen and Hussein
(1999) method to approximate the resulting process using a 7-state Markov chain for mt,
and a binary process for t. It is important to note that the resulting 14 state Markov
21process does not full the monotonicity assumption of the theory section, as transitions
are identical across transitory shocks. The income process thus belongs to a more general
class than that analysed in the previous sections.
For preferences, I choose a CRRA utility function with coecient of relative risk aversion
of 1 (log-preferences) and a discount factor of 0:96. In order capture the features of the
US economy more accurately than in the simple theoretical model, I allow agents to save
at the equilibrium interest rate after default, and introduce production in the economy.
In particular, I assume that competitive rms hire capital and labour from households to




and set the labour share  to 0.3. Again, the calibration follows Krueger and Perri (2006),
who choose the depreciation rate of capital  and total factor productvity A to target a
capital-output ratio of 2.6 and an interest rate of 4 percent in their benchmark period. The
corresponding values of A and  are 0:9637 and 0:0754 respectively. The computational
algorithm to solve for the stationary equilibrium rst solves for the stationary equilibrium
for a given interest rate, following the appendix that describes the recursions that derive
the stationary consumption distribution in the general case.8 I then use the bisection
method to nd the market clearing interest rate R?.
5.2 Joint distributions of c,y,w - Theory and non-parametric
estimates from US micro-data
This section presents the joint distributions of consumption, wealth and income. In
particular, I compare the distributions in Krueger and Perri's (2006) limited commitment
economy to non-parametric estimates of their counterparts in US-microdata, as well as
those in a simple self-insurance Ayagari economy. The latter has the same income process,
technology and preferences described before, but agents can only save and borrow in
uncontingent bonds subject to a borrowing limit equal to annual income. I calculate
8I amend this for the fact that, with purely transitory shocks t, the monotonicity condition for F
does not hold. So I need to reshue income states occasionally in order to have decreasing minimum-
participation-compatible consumption values c1
0 > c2
0 > ::: > cN
0 during the algorithm. The solution is
facilitated by the fact that, if this monotonicity condition holds, ci
0 can be found quickly using bisections
on an interval [zi;c
i+1
0 ]. This yields an algorithm that is extremely ecient when solving for the stationary
consumption distribution.
22the joint distributions by applying a simple histogramm density estimator to the exact
theoretical distribution of the limited commitment model, and to a simulation of the
Ayagari economy.9 To compare the theoretical densities to the data, I then estimate
bivariate kernel densities for US data on consumption and wealth, based on an optimal
choice of the bandwith as in Botev et al (2009).
5.2.1 The distribution of consumption and income
Figures 3 and 4 use consumption and income data from the 2003 wave of the US Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to confront their estimated joint density with that from
the models. Particularly, I use the dataset constructed by Krueger and Perri (2006), and
their denition of income and consumption. Their income measure corresponds to the
CEX measure of after-tax labour earnings plus transfers (the sum of wages and salaries
of all household members, plus a xed fraction of self-employment farm and nonfarm
income, minus reported federal, state, and local taxes (net of refunds) and Social Secu-
rity contributions). Importantly, the consumption series includes an imputed measure
of services from durables (for details see Krueger and Perri 2006). From both of these
series I partial out the eect of a vector of observable individual characteristics, to con-
trol for ex-ante dierences or predictable changes in life-time wealth.10 Figure 2 and 3
show that the results from the theory continue to hold with the more general income
process: the marginal distribution of consumption in the Krueger and Perri (2006) cali-
bration, presented in gure 2 where equal colours correspond to individuals who were last
constrained in the same income state, is a mixture of geometric subdistributions. And
gure 3 shows that consumption rises on average with current income, but is highly het-
eroscedastic. In particular, the conditional variance of consumption declines as we move
up the income distribution. The Ayagari economy, interestingly, also has some decline in
conditional variances, although less so than the limited commitment economy. The data
has a roughly homoscedastic, increasing shape of the conditional distribution.
Figure 4 presents the joint distribution of consumption and income growth. Its rst strik-
9The histogramm density estimation for the Ayagari economy is based on an individual simulated
income and consumption path of 100.000 periods, of which I discard the rst 1000 for the estimation.
10Particularly, unless otherwise mentioned, I use residuals from a regression of income and consumption
on a cubic in the household head's age, and dummies that equal 1 if the household head has a unversity
degree, a college degree, a high school degree, is male, is black, is asian, or of some other non-white race.
I concentrate on households where the head is between 16 and 64 years of age.
23ing features are the important dierences between the 2 model densities: in the limited
commitment economy, as suggested by theory, income declines are perfectly shared, result-
ing in a oor to the distribution slightly below zero. Positive income shocks are followed
by a variety of positive consumption responses, leading to a strong rise in the conditional
variance of the distribution for larger shocks. The Ayagari model on the other hand has a
much more homoscedastic shape around a roughly linear mean response of consumption
to income growth. To compare these distributions to the data, gure 4 uses log-dierences
of the raw data, not the residuals from the rst stage regression. The resulting estimate
of the distribution shows neither the downward cap, nor the heteroscedasticity of the
limited commitment model. Rather, the cloud character of the picture suggest important
measurement error in the CEX data. The picture is practically unchanged if we use the
residuals from the rst stage regression.
Figure 2: The marginal distribution of consumption and its subdistribu-
tions
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3: The joint distribution of consumption and income
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4: The joint distribution of consumption and income growth
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
5.2.2 The distribution of wealth and income
Figure 5 performs a similar exercise for the joint distribution of wealth and income, using
the net worth variable of the 2004 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and
chopping o the upper 1 percent of all distributions to control for outliers and top-coding.
In the limited commitment economy insurance lowers the nancial wealth of high income
households. So, even with the more general income process, the income rich have minimum
wealth. Since individuals slowly deplete their wealth levels after a negative income shock,
the income poor have a variety of positive wealth levels, including the highest in the
24economy. In the Ayagari economy, on the other hand, the buerstock nature of wealth
leads on average to a positive relationship between income and wealth levels. But there
is large variation around the mean, as individuals slowly build up, or draw down, their
wealth after income changes. The mass of individuals at the borrowing constraint clearly
rises as income falls. Comparing this to the SCF data, we see both an increase in mean
wealth, as well as in its variance, as income, measured as salaries plus a proportion of
business income, rises.
The SCF is a cross-section, so does not allow us to look at changes in wealth. But gure
6 compares the joint distributions of nancial income and earned income in the model
and the data. Again, the insurance mechanism leads to a strong negative correlation
between income and nancial returns in the limited commitment model, with the expected
declining conditional variances. In the data, we nd a positive relationship between
nancial and other income, as in the Ayagari model.
Figure 5: The cross-sectional distribution of wealth and income
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 6: The cross-sectional distribution of nancial income and income
[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
6 Conclusion
This study has looked at the equilibrium distribution of agents in an economy where lim-
ited commitment to contracts constrains risk-sharing. The theoretical contribution was
to prove existence and uniquencess of a stationary equilibrium in a continuum limited
commitment economy, and to provide an analytical characterisation of the distribution
of consumption and income, including a closed form solution for an example with two
income states and CRRA preferences. The theory showed how the asymmetric nature
of insurance in the model, where negative shocks are shared but positive shocks lead to
idiosyncratic consumption growth, implies declining conditional variances of wealth and
consumption along the income distribution, and a negative relationship between wealth
and income on average. The quantitative part of the paper looked at a limited com-
mitment economy with capital and a more general income process, to compare the joint
25equilibrium distributions, and their characteristic non-linearity and heteroscedasiticity,
with non-parametric estimates of the counterparts in US micro data, and those in a sim-
ple Ayagari economy. The results showed that, even with a more realistic income process
featuring both near-permanent and transitory shocks, the limited commitment economy
still produces very asymmetric joint distributions: consumption growth has a oor slightly
below zero, but an upward tail that becomes more important for stronger positive income
shocks. And both the mean and variance of wealth fall with income. Importantly, both
the data and the Ayagari model have less heteroscedastic distributions, and mean wealth
that rises with income.
The approach of this paper, to focus on the shape of joint distributions in order to test eco-
nomic models with heterogeneous agents against the empiricial evidence, provides plenty
of room for further research. One direction would be to generalise the model economies
analysed here, to see if their characteristics are robust. For example, Broer (2009c) shows
that amending the calibration used in this paper to include some heterogeneity in dis-
count factors can largely reconcile the model-impact of near-permanent income shocks on
current consumption growth with the data. On the other hand, a more thorough descrip-
tion of the joint distributions in micro-data is needed. Here, the new dataset provided
by Blundell et al (2008), who have imputed a series of non-durable consumption for the
PSID on the basis of its food expenditure information and a consumption demand func-
tion estimated on CEX data, seems very promising. And nally, the equality of model
distributions and data should be tested more rigorously, accounting appropriately for the
important role of measurement error in the data.
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298 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The planner's decision rule   has the form
i;t+1 = maxft+1(zi;t+1);i;tg
For every t, t(z) is strictly increasing in z; and for every z, the sequence t(z) increases
strictly over time. Also, the set of individual planner weights with positive mass is strictly
nite: jfj : I(fi : i;t = jg) > 0gj < 1;8t.
Proof
To prove the rst statement write the dierence between continuation values V (i;zi)
and autarky values W(zi) as
t(;z









s 1maxf(ut+s()   u(z));0g (34)
where Fi is the ith row of F, u(z) the Nx1 vector of utilities from consuming income, ut()
the constant vector of utility from having planner weight  in period t, and 0 the zero
vector.  is thus the discounted sum of \utility in excess of autarky" across states where
individuals are unconstrained, as in all constrained states autarky and continuation values
cancel. It can be interpreted as a measure of insurance benets promised to individual
i. Note that t(t(zi);zi) = 0 denes the minimum participation compatible planner
weight t(zi).
I rst show (;zj) is strictly increasing in zj, for all . For any 
t(;z




















s 1maxf(ut+s()   u(z));0g (35)
= t(;z
j+1) (36)
30where the second inequality follows from monotonicity of F, since the vector maxf(ut+s() 
u(z));0g is decreasing in income values. Since t(t(zj);zj) = t(t(zj+1);zj+1) = 0 it
follows that t(zj) > t(zj+1).
To see that the sequence t(z) is strictly increasing for every income level z, note rst that
Assumption 1 implies a positive mass of agents with binding participation constraints ev-
ery period, who experience an increase in their planner weights. Given constant resources,
any constant i;t+1 = i;t then implies strictly declining consumption of individual i ac-
cording to (13). Thus, since the autarky value W(zj) is constant through time, con-
stant or declining cuto values t+1(zj)  t(zj) violate participation constraints. So
t+1(zj) > t(zj).
Finally, to see that the set of individual planner weights with positive mass is strictly
nite, note rst that the minimum participation compatible planner weights t(z) lie in
a nite interval dened by 1 <
t(z1)
t(zN)  z1
zN 8t, as otherwise participation constraints for
some individuals are slack either today or at some point in the future. Since initial plan-
ner weights are strictly positive and nite, the ratio of maximum and minimum planner
weights is bounded in all periods. As the sequence of t(zN) is strictly increasing there is
an  > 0 such that
t+1(zN)
t(zN) > 1+; 8t. But then the number of periods an individual can
remain unconstrained is strictly bounded by T = min(x 2 N : x >
ln(z1) ln(zN)
ln(1+) ). Since in
every period there are at most N new weights, the number of planner weights is bounded
by NT plus the number of initial weights K. 
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1: The consumption distribution in
the general case
For 1 < R < 1
 the interest rate in stationary equilibrium, the joint distribution of income
and consumption C : C  Z  ! [0;1] has the following features:
1. C is discrete, with positive mass at consumption values between minimum income
and some upper bound c1




2. There are N minimum levels of consumption ci
0; i = 1;:::;N under which con-
sumption of agents with income i never falls and where participation constraints
at income zi hold with equality. These threshold levels are increasing in income
31c1
0 < c2
0 < :::: < cN
0 . The lower bound of the distribution is minimum income
cN
0 = zN.
3. Every consumption threshold ci
0 is an upper bound to a geometric subdistribution
of consumption i
C, with support fci
jg recursively dened by the law of motion
U0(ci
j+1 = RU0(ci
j);j = 0;1;2;:::, and bounded below by zN. C is thus a mixture
of N   1 geometric distributions C;i;i = 1;:::;N   1. The appendix contains an
analytical expression for the frequencies in this distribution.
4. Individuals at the higest income level z1 all have maximum consumption level c1
0.
The support of consumption conditional on income zi;i > 1 is [ci
0;c1
1]. So the support
of consumption narrows as income rises. For i.i.d. transitions (identical rows in F),
this implies that the conditional variance of consumption falls monotonously in
income.
Proof
The proof is by construction of the stationary consumption distribution.
Ad 1-3: The support C
I construct C \bottom-up", starting from its lower bound, which we know to be minimum
income. Also, from Lemma 1, we know that minimum participation-compatible levels
of consumption ci
0 increase in income zi. Since ci
0 solves the participation constrained
of individuals at income zi with equality, this allows me to recursively determine ci
0 by
substituting into the ith participation constraint the autarky values at incomes zj > zi;j =
i;i 1;:::;1 for future states with non-negative income shocks, and the consumption values
given by the law of motion (15) for unconstrained states. Starting at i = N 1 and moving
up income levels assures that this procedure can keep account of binding participation
constraints as individuals move down in consumption from ci
0 to ZN.
To see this in detail, denote as ci(c;R) the result of applying the law of motion for
unconstrained transitions (15) i times starting from level c at interest rate R.
We know cN
0 = ZN. Consider minimum participation-compatible consumption in the
second lowest income state N   1. There, individuals receive c
N 1
0 today, the value of
which we want to determine. They face the \danger" of moving, with probability fN 1;N,
to state N, and thus down to c1(c
N 1
0 ;R) tomorrow. With probability fN 1;i, however,
they move to income zi > zN receiving W(i). So c
N 1
0 is uniquely determined from the
32participation constraint
W(N   1) =
U(c
N 1




















Here, the second term on the right-hand side of the equation is the value from the de-
clining consumption path starting at c
N 1
0 and truncated at minimum level cN
0 , weighted
by the probability to remain in income state N. The third term is the continuation value
when not receiving a negative income shock tomorrow, the fourth from moving down in
income tomorrow and then receiving positive income shocks at a later date. Note that the
right hand side is increasing in c
N 1
0 while the left hand side is constant. So the solution
is unique.
3. Analogously, one can determine the other values ci
0 from repeated application of this
algorithm.
The support of the consumption distribution C is simply the union of downward-sloping
paths starting at minimum participation-compatible consumption ci
0 C = [N
i=1fmax[cj(ci
0;R);zN];j =
0;1;2;:::g. Note that the highest level of consumption c1
0 is strictly lower than the highest
income level zh from assumption A2, which implies that there is at least one unconstrained
transition of individuals at z1 that receive a shock zN, which happens with positive prob-
ability. With c1
0  z1 the participation constraint would thus be slack, as continuation
utilities under insurance are strictly greater than in autarky in at least 1 state of the
world. This however cannot be optimal for the planner, so we have c1
0 < z1.
Ad 3: The frequency distribution on C
I construct the frequency distribution \top-down". From Lemma 1, I know that all high
income individuals are constrained, at the minimum participation-compatible consump-
tion for individuals with the highest income c1
0. Thus, its mass is equal to the stationary
mass of individuals at z1. The rest of the frequency distribution is then based on the
transition probabilities as follows:
Dene i
C to be the subdistribution of consumption that contains all indivduals that
were last constrained at income zi. Out of individuals with highest income last period,
all but those that remain at z1 move down in consumption to c1(c1
0;R), according to the
law of motion (15). Denoting the ith row of F as Fi, and dening the Matrix F i as F
33with the rst i columns and rows replaced by zeros, and disregarding other thresholds






1 on support given by (cn(c1





ln()ln(R) c periods individuals at income 2 hit their participation constraint
on the downward-sloping path cn(c1
0;R), they drop out of this distribution, equivalent to
F 1 shrinking to F 2. Equivalent reasoning for lower values of income yields the following
vector valued sequence of joint frequencies on c1











j ;j = 1;:::N;tj = 1;:::Tj (39)




ln()ln(R) c the integer number of unconstrained transitions
between threshold levels of consumption ck
0 and c
k+1
0 . The marginal subdistribution 1
C
is simply the the row sum of the expression.
More generally, the joint subdistribution of income and consumption starting at con-
sumption threshold ci
0 with support ci












j ;j = i;:::N;tj = 1;:::Tj (40)






n;t(i;i) is the stationary mass of individuals at income
level zi minus those with income zi and consumption above the treashold ci
0.
Ad 4: The conditional distribution of consumption
The strictly positive entries of F ensure that the least upper bound of consumption by
individuals at income zi;i = 2;:::;N is the rst downward step from the threshold level
for z1, c1(c1
0;R) = c1
1. The greatest lower bound of consumption for indivdiuals at income
zi is of course threshold value ci
0, so the minimum interval covering the discrete support
of consumption conditional on income zi;i > 1 is [c1
1;ci
0]. Since ci
0 increases with income,
the width of the interval decreases.
Monotonicity of transitions ensures that individuals at lower incomes are concentrated
in lower parts of subdistributions, which can be shown to lead to conditional means
that increase in income. Conditional variances on the other hand are non-monotononic.
Assuming i.i.d. uncertainty, however, or identical rows in F, it is evident that Cjzi is
simply Cjzi+1 with a truncated tail, and the tail-mass moved to the truncation point.
This implies conditional variances that decrease monotononously in income values.
11To keep notation concise I take 0
i=1xi = 1;0
i=1xi = 0;8xi.
348.3 Proof of Corollary 2
With CRRA preferences and 2 income values, the following is true:
1. The covariance between income and consumption is positive. The covariances be-
tween income and both nancial returns and wealth are negative.
2. The mean of consumption increases in income. Its conditional variance decreases.
3. If C(cm)  0, the cross-sectional variance of log-consumption in stationary equi-
librium is





where  > 0 is a function of transition probabilities only. If there is a non-negligible
mass at the truncation point, C(cm) > 0, this is an upper bound for the cross-
sectional variance of individual consumption.
Proof Ad 1: The covariance of income and consumption is given by
E(c   c)(z   z) (42)
= (c1   c)(z





l   z) (43)
= (c1   c)[(z
h   z)   (z
l   z)] (44)
= (c1   c)[z
h   z
l] > 0 (45)
where c is the mean of consumption, and the second equality imposes market clearing
Pm
2 (1   p)qi 1(ci   c) =  (c1   c).
To see the second statement, note that the joint distribution of nancial returns and




2   q   p
: =  (46)
(yfin;ij1<i<m;z







(;) = 0 otherwise (49)
35for
yfin;1 = c1   zh < 0
yfin;i = zl   c1(R)
i
 > 0;1 < i < m
yfin;i = 0 (50)
where B(I) denotes the Borel sets on interval I. So high income agents have strictly
negative nancial income, while individuals with low income have non-negative nancial
income. This of course implies negative covariance, equal to
E(yfin   yfin)(z   z) (51)
(c1   z
h)(z






l   z) (52)
 (c1   z
h)(z
h   z) < 0 (53)
where the last line follows from (ci   zl)(zl   z)  0; 8i > 1 The joint distribution of
nancial wealth and income W : R  fzl;zhg  ! [0;1] has the same frequencies as





















The covariance of income and nancial wealth is given by
E(A   A)(z   z) (55)
= (A1)(z





l   z) (56)
= (z
h   z)(A1)   (z





where the third line exploits the fact that nancial wealth sums to zero across individuals.
Ad 2: Both statements follow immediately from the fact that high-income individuals
are located at a mass point on the upper bound of the consumption support.
Ad 3:
361. Denote the rst entry of the normalised left eigenvector of transition matrix F associ-
ated with a unit eigenvalue as  =
(1 q)
(2 q p), and the log of x as b x.
2. The mean of logc is






i + b ch]q
i 1g (60)
= b ch +
1   p




3. The variance is
V ARc = 
(1   p)2
























(1   q)2(2   q   p)2 (64)
+(1   p)[
(1 + q)
(1   q)3   2
(1   p)
(1   q)3(2   q   p)
+
(1   p)2







(1   q)3(2   q   p)
+
(1   p)(1 + q)





2(1   p)(1 + q(1   p   q))
(1   q)2(2   p   q)2 (67)
The more general result for the truncated case with C(cm) > 0 is not dicult, but
algebraically messy, to compute. But note that the variance of an truncated geometric
distribution is stricly lower, and that for the i.i.d. case 1   p = q both the mean and the
variance reduce to those for an ordinary geometric distribution. 
379 Tables and gures
























The gure shows an individual's consumption as she moves through periods of high (blue line)
and low income (red line).
































































































































































































































































































The gure shows the marginal distribution of consumption in the Krueger and Perri (2006)
calibration. Equal colours denote individuals that were last constrained at equal income values
and are thus located on the same geometric subdistribution of consumption.
40Figure 3: Joint distribution of consumption and
income
































The gure shows the joint densities of consumption and income in the limited commitment
economy, a simple Ayagari economy, and in CEX data. The size of dots is proportional to the
frequency mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical distribution uses an
optimal bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on residuals from a rst-stage regression of
the variables on observable individual characteristics as described in the main text.
41Figure 4: Joint distribution of consumption and
income changes

























































The gure shows the joint densities of consumption and income growth in the limited
commitment economy, a simple Ayagari economy, and in CEX data. The size of dots is
proportional to the frequency mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical
distribution uses an optimal bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on dierences in the
raw data.
42Figure 5: Joint distribution of wealth and income










































The gure shows the joint densities of wealth and income in the limited commitment economy,
a simple Ayagari economy, and in SCF data. The size of dots is proportional to the frequency
mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical distribution uses an optimal
bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on residuals from a rst-stage regression of the
variables on observable individual characteristics as described in the main text.
43Figure 6: Joint distribution of net nancial returns
and income









































































The gure shows the joint densities of nancial returns and income in the limited commitment
economy, a simple Ayagari economy, and in SCF data. The size of dots is proportional to the
frequency mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical distribution uses an
optimal bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on residuals from a rst-stage regression of
the variables on observable individual characteristics as described in the main text.
44